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Abstract   This paper explores the economic performance of a fishery that oper-
ates under an individual transferable quota (ITQs) management system and that
is subject to an in-season stock externality. While Boyce (1992) and others have
established theoretically that ITQ management is not fully efficient under all
conditions, this is the first study that empirically estimates the efficiency losses
due to an in-season stock externality in an actual fishery. We study the New
Zealand southern scallop fishery, which has been under ITQ management since
1992. Our analysis provides evidence of a race-to-fish in the fishery, and esti-
mates that individual firm profits were approximately $2,300 and $2,000 (20%
and 10%) less in 1996 and 1997, respectively, than they would have been under
optimal management. We recommend modifications in the ITQ policy to improve
the economic performance of the fishery.
Key words   Fisheries management, individual quotas, stock depletion, New
Zealand, scallops.
JEL Classification Codes Q220, Q280, Q570, Q580.
Introduction
This paper examines the economic performance of a fishery that operates under an
individual transferable quota (ITQ) management system and is subject to an in-sea-
son stock externality. Boyce (1992) shows that an ITQ system cannot solve
in-season stock and congestion externalities in a fishery.1 In addition, Boyce (1992,
pp. 399, 403) correctly observes that whether these externalities exist, and how well
ITQs can deal with them, are empirical questions. He further notes the lack of em-
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pirical studies of these questions. There are numerous studies that document the su-
perior performance of ITQs as compared to other management measures (Boyce
1992, OECD 1997, Morey 1986, NRC 1999, Geen and Nayer 1988, Repetto 2001).
However, to our knowledge there are no studies that empirically measure the effi-
ciency losses caused by stock depletion, congestion, seasonality, and other factors.2
We develop a theoretical model of the New Zealand southern scallop fishery,
which has been under ITQ management since 1992, and which exhibits an in-season
stock externality. We formally compare the harvest path of ITQ management with
the harvest path that is fully efficient for the fishery. A numerical version of the
model is used to empirically estimate the magnitudes of the efficiency losses that
are due to the in-season stock externality during the course of a fishing year in this
fishery. We conclude the paper with a discussion of alternative policy measures that
may improve the fishery’s economic performance.
Background3
The Southern scallop fishery is located at the north end of New Zealand’s South Is-
land (figure 1). Annual catches have ranged from 1,246 tonnes (meat weight) in
1975 to zero in 1981 and 1982. After periods of regulated access and effort restric-
tions, a Quota Management System (QMS) was introduced into most of New
Zealand’s commercial finfish fisheries in 1986 (Arbuckle and Drummond 2000).
Shellfish stocks from the northern South Island (the Challenger area) were added to
the QMS in 1992 (scallops) and 1997 (dredge oysters). The QMS program is a sys-
tem of harvesting rights in the form of ITQs.
Scallop beds are located within two large relatively sheltered bays, Tasman and
Golden Bay, as well as the area of New Zealand known as the Marlborough Sound.
A rotational fishing and enhancement regime has been operational in the Tasman
and Golden Bay sections of the Challenger scallop fishery since 1989.4 Fishing
grounds are divided into nine sectors. Each year an agreed upon number of sectors is
opened to commercial fishing and, after being fished down, each sector is seeded with
scallop spat. The seeded spat within rotational areas are left to grow undisturbed by the
commercial fleet for a period of two and a half to three years before being harvested. In
some years, as much as 80% of the available stock is estimated to be of seeded origin.
Up to 70 scallop vessels ranging in size from 12 to 20 meters utilize potentially 850
square kilometers of seabed during annual harvests between August and December.
The total scallop harvest was 300 and 547 tonnes in 1996 and 1997, respectively.
In 1994, the ITQ owners of the southern scallop fishery established the Chal-
lenger Scallop Enhancement Company (CSEC) as a non-profit company to
implement an enhancement program. The owners of Challenger scallop fishery
quota exclusively hold the shares of the CSEC. Voting rights for appointment of Di-
rectors and approving the annual business plan and annual management plans (that
include which sectors will be open and annual catch limits) are held in proportion to
quota ownership in the fishery.
The company was successful in negotiating a contract with the government to
implement an enhancement plan. Initially, levies were collected by the government
2 In fact, despite the strong influence of seasonality in most fisheries, there has been surprisingly little
analysis of its implications for management policy.
3 This description of the fishery is based on Arbuckle and Drummond (2000).
4 The Ministry of Fisheries implemented and enforced rotational fishing prior to the formation of the
Challenger Scallop Enhancement Company (CSEC) in 1994, when the CSEC assumed responsibility for
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and held in trust for the purpose of implementing the plan. In 1996, the scallop
quota owners and CSEC shareholders voted to replace the government funding arrange-
ment with a commodity levy set by a vote in their general meeting. The government
discontinued their levy, and a Memorandum of Understanding was developed be-
tween the Ministry of Fisheries and the owners of the quota and the CSEC.
The CSEC’s objectives were to facilitate the collection of funds to finance fish-
eries management activities, including research, set rules to achieve effort spreading
or seasonal closures, impose sanctions for non-compliance, and represent the inter-
ests of shareholders in government processes such as setting Total Allowable
Catches (TACs). The CSEC has attempted to implement its management regime by
use of civil contract and regulation to overcome free riders who may not otherwise
be willing to pay levies and enter into collective management agreements. The scal-
lop fishery is relatively small, and industry participation in the management of this
fishery is highly developed.
Under the QMS, the Minister of Fisheries officially sets the TAC for the fishery,
which was 720 tonnes each for 1996 and 1997, even though actual observed catches
were much lower.5 To account for this disparity, the CSEC effectively lowered the
Figure 1.  Golden and Tasman Bays with an Inset of New Zealand
5 The Southern scallop fishery is exempt from normal sustainability criteria (based on maximum sustain-
able yield) because the purpose and principles of the Fisheries Act are better delivered in this fishery by
rotational fishing and enhancement (Arbuckle and Drummond 2000).Bisack and Sutinen 234
TAC for the quota holders with what is called a leaseback program. For example, in
1996 the CSEC lowered the TAC by 51.4% to 350 tonnes. Each holder/owner of
scallop quota owned a share of the 720 tonnes. Upon agreement by quota holders,
the 51.4% of the TAC (370 tonnes) was ‘leased back’ to the CSEC. In 1997, 62.5%
of the TAC was leased back to the CSEC. Sizeable portions of the quota were effec-
tively shelved and not fished during these two years.6 Harvesting is allowed to
continue as long as it is economically feasible and does not exceed the adjusted
TAC. Once an area is fished down, it is seeded and closed until it becomes economi-
cally desirable to harvest again. In addition to quota, the CSEC has governed and
constrained catches by limiting access to rotational areas and imposing daily catch
limits in particular sectors.
The agreement to lease back their quota to Challenger was to hold this quota
and only release it if more scallops were available. This was an attempt to weaken
the race-to-fish incentive by limiting the total amount of quota available. According
to Arbuckle (personal communication 2002; Arbuckle and Drummond 2000) this
policy was only partially effective in earlier years because the catch was less than
the amount of lease left in the fishery. He thought that the policy may have removed
some of the race-to-fish incentives and also may have avoided the need for govern-
ment intervention to arbitrarily and inflexibly adjust the TAC.
Daily catch limits on individual vessels have been in place since the mid-1980s
when the government was managing the fishery. The CSEC continued these daily
limits and, in 1996, established penalties for catch taken in excess of the limits
(Arbuckle and Drummond 2000). As explained below, these daily limits were not
binding in 1996–97 and did not stem the race-to-fish in the fishery. The race-to-fish
and excessive catches early in the season have been concerns of the CSEC at least
since 1996, if not before.7
The company recently has sought to reduce the downsides of the race to fish by
reducing daily catch quotas (pro-rated on total access to catch by vessel) to a level
where vessels are able to concentrate more on quality than simply filling their quota
with whatever comes over the stern (Mincher 2005). However, Mincher (2005) re-
ports that this is not as effective as they wish for two reasons: (i) Vessel skippers
still try to out-compete each other on the basis of how early they can get their catch
and return to port; and (ii) daily quotas are only effective as long as catch is con-
strained by them; once fish density reduces so that the effective limit on catch is the
time available to fish between sun-up and sun-down, the pressure to take whatever
is available returns. The company has also introduced a policy of matching total
vessel numbers to total anticipated catch.8
A Theoretical Model of the Southern Scallop Fishery
Consistent with actual practice in New Zealand, we assume that the government
sets, or agrees to, a TAC for the fishing year and that the TAC may be set exogenous
to (independently of) the optimization problems analyzed below. In other words, the
government may set the TAC based on biological or other non-economic criteria.
6 New Zealand has now introduced an annual form of quota called Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE).
ACE is allocated at the beginning of a fishing year based on quota holdings, and it is only ACE that can be
used to balance catch. In other words, an ACE sale (purchase) is essentially the same as a quota lease.
7 The CEO of CSEC asked the second author to investigate this issue in 1996, and this paper is the result
of that (lengthy) investigation.
8 There is a pre-established sliding scale of desirable vessel numbers, ranging from 35 at 186 tonnes of
anticipated harvest, to 50 vessels at 746 tonnes.A New Zealand ITQ Fishery 235
Following Boyce (1992), our model focuses on the fishery throughout the
course of a single year and uses a discount rate equal to zero.9 The fishing year be-
gins at t = 0 with a predetermined resource stock, Χ. In contrast to Boyce (1992),
we assume there is a positive net rate of natural growth of the stock during the fish-
ing year, which is given by G(X).10 We also assume that there is no significant
bycatch of scallops by other fisheries. Therefore, the stock size changes by the
amount of natural growth and fish harvested each period. Harvesting costs increase
and profits decrease as the stock is depleted.11
Optimal Harvest of the Fishery
For optimal harvest of the predetermined TAC (denoted by QQ 0 = ), the problem for































XX X q Q tt
i
T 0 00 0 = ≥≥ ≥ ,, ,,
where Xt is the size of the stock in period t, T is the end of the fishing year, and qi
t is
the harvest rate in period t by firm i (i = 1, 2,..., N). We represent the individual
firm’s profit function by πi(qi
t Xt), where, over the relevant range, the marginal oper-
ating profit is positive and decreasing in harvest, and profits increase as the stock
increases; i.e.,  πi
q > 0, πi
qq < 0, πi
X > 0, πi
qX > 0, and subscripts other than t indicate
partial derivatives. The TAC is given by Q.  The necessary conditions for an interior
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9 The fishing season usually lasts less than four months.
10 The net rate of growth is net of natural mortality. This feature of the theoretical model is incorporated
in the empirical model developed below.
11 The distributions of scallops are patchy, and the catch-per-unit-of-effort (CPUE) is high in the begin-
ning of the year. Harvesting thins out the patches, and the CPUE of scallops decreases and vessels find
it desirable to move to more dense patches. As more of the leased quota (TAC) is filled, the number of
unexploited patches decreases and the search time for new patches increases over the year. As the CPUE
decreases and the cost of fishing increases, the marginal value of the stock decreases for the firm as the
year progresses.
12 The Hamiltonian from which these conditions are derived is:
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λμ μ tttT T XX ≥≥≥⋅ = 000 0 ,,, , (5)
where μt is the dynamic multiplier of the resource stock, Xt, and λt the shadow price
of the TAC. Since  ˙ , , λλ λ == 0 t  a constant.
Equations (1–5) determine the path of harvest rates during the course of the
fishing year. To examine how stock depletion affects harvest rates during the year,
we totally differentiate the optimality condition, equation (2), and use equation (3)
and the dynamic constraint on the resource stock to obtain:
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As can be seen from equation (6), the optimal path of harvest may increase or de-
crease over the course of the fishing season. We use this equation below to explain
how and why optimal harvest of the TAC is not achieved under ITQ management in
this fishery.13
Harvest under Individual Transferable Quotas
Under ITQs, the TAC, which is equal to Q  as above, is initially allocated to the
firms in the fishery. The i-th firm initially receives a quota given by yi
0, where
yQ i
i 0 = ∑ . Each firm aims to maximize the sum of profits for the year, given that it
can purchase or sell quota at a market-determined price, vt, each period.
Following Boyce (1992), Arnason (1990), and others, we assume that each firm
takes into account the resource constraint and the amount of fishing by other firms.
Fishing firms predict the amount of fishing by other firms, and a Nash-Cournot
equilibrium is attained when firms correctly predict each other’s harvest rates.
Given these conditions, the i-th firm solves the following optimization problem:
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where zi
t (or –zi
t) is the quantity of quota purchased (or sold) by the firm in a period,
vt is the price of quota, and yi
0 is the firm’s initial allocation of quota. The necessary
conditions for this problem include:14
13 It is also useful to note for the empirical analysis below that the path of aggregate production is given
by  ˙ ˙ . Qq tt
i
i = ∑
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for all i firms; where τi
t is the i-th firm’s co-state variable on its quota holdings, and
σi
t is the firm’s assessment of its co-state variable on the resource stock.
We assume that a competitive market determines the price of a unit of quota in
each period, vt. Since vt = τi
t, from equation (11), and  ˙ , τi =0  from equation (12), the
equilibrium market price (v*) is constant across the year.15
The expression for the path of harvest under ITQs in this case is derived by to-
tally differentiating equation (10) and using some of the other necessary conditions
above, which yields:
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Optimal and ITQ Harvest Paths Compared
By comparing the two sets of necessary conditions — equations (2)-(5) and equa-
tions (10)-(13) — one can see that harvest rates under ITQs are different from those
for optimal harvest of the TAC. This implies that ITQ management does not neces-
sarily maximize economic yield from the TAC.
In addition, the paths of the two harvest rates over the course of the fishing year
differ from one another, which can be seen by comparing equation (6) with equation
(15). The term Σiπi
X appears in the numerator of the RHS of equation (6), while in
equation (15) the comparable term is πi
X. The individual firm under ITQs accounts
only for the impact its harvest has on its own profits, whereas the optimal solution
accounts for the effect each firm’s harvest has on the profits of all firms. ITQ man-
agement does not induce fishermen to fully internalize the costs of their actions in
the presence of a stock depletion externality.
A comparison of equation (6) for the optimal case with equation (15) for the
ITQ case reveals that more scallops are harvested early in the fishing year under
ITQs than in the optimal case. The ITQ harvest path is higher early in the fishing
year, which reflects the race-to-fish behavior when the stock effect is not fully ac-
15 The derived demand for quota by each firm is given by solving equation (10), and aggregate demand
is the sum of these derived demands across periods and firms. The market price of quota is where aggre-
gate demand equals total supply, the TAC. One price for quota emerges since a unit of quota can be used
at any time during the year, since units of quota are not dated by period of the year. Note that the con-
stant market spot price of quota across the year is a theoretical result and, as such, is a hypothesis that
could be tested if data on trades were available.Bisack and Sutinen 238
counted for by individual vessels. Individual firms place too low a marginal value
on the stocks early in the fishing year, which is one cause of the race-to-fish in the
New Zealand scallop fishery.16
A Numerical Model of the Fishery
Data
To empirically estimate the efficiency losses in the New Zealand southern scallop
fishery, we drew on three sets of data provided by the CSEC for 1996 and 1997. The
first data set consisted of data on the characteristics of the vessels participating in
this fishery. The second data set included detailed trip information, while the third set of
data was a report that included annual abundance estimates of the scallops in Golden
and Tasman Bays (CSEC 1996, 1997; Cranfield, Micheal, and Doonan 1997).
The data on vessel characteristics includes the number of years the skipper has
been fishing, vessel length, engine horsepower, and the size of the scallop dredge.
Detailed trip data identified the processor that landings were sold to, vessel name and
number, quantity landed, date landed, and areas fished by individual vessels. Scallop
landings are measured in tonnes of meat and green weight landed, where meat is the
muscle and green weight includes the shell. There were 6 individual processors and 70
vessels fished approximately 2,027 and 1,863 days in 1996 and 1997, respectively.
The empirical analysis focuses on the fishery within Golden Bay. The majority
of scallop catches occurred in Golden Bay (figure 1) during 1996 and 1997 (53%
and 80%, respectively). Table 1 presents the abundance estimates; total landings;
and the average catch-per-unit-of-effort (CPUE) by year, location, and area. In 1996
and 1997, Golden Bay had the highest CPUE. Landings in 1996 were primarily from
area A with a small amount from area B. In 1997, area A was closed and harvesting
took place primarily in area C with a small amount in area B.
The fishing year was divided into week-long periods, and the weekly landings
in Golden Bay were analyzed to compare ITQ harvest patterns with optimal harvest
patterns. The length of the scallop season for this fishery is approximately two to
three months. Our model evaluates harvesting paths over 8 and 11 weeks for 1996
and 1997, respectively. Table 2 shows total catch, total effort, and CPUE for Golden
Bay and all other areas by week and year. In 1996 harvesting was very high in the
first week, dropped to a quarter of the amount in the second week, and continued to
drop as time passed. The same pattern can be seen in 1997.
Estimation of Production, Cost, and Growth Functions
Effort Standardization
Trip and vessel characteristics data and abundance estimates were used to standard-
ize a vessel’s fishing effort and to estimate production and cost functions
parameters. We used qi = aiEiXb as the form of the individual fishing firm’s produc-
tion function, where qi is catch by the i-th firm; Ei is the firm’s nominal effort; X is
the stock level; and ai is the firm’s catchability coefficient, which is a function of a
16 Other causes that could explain the race-to-fish behavior include high rates of time preference and
weather conditions that affect the decision to harvest, which are not examined herein due to a lack of
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Table 1
September Abundance Estimates (tonnes of meat), Total Catch (tonnes of meat),
and the Average Catch-per-Unit-of-Effort (CPUE) by Year, Location, and Area
Year Location Area Abundance Catch CPUE2
1996
Golden Bay A 171.2 111.3 0.170
Golden Bay B 27.0 11.7 0.131
Tasman Bay D 47.6 10.9 0.057
Tasman Bay F 211.8 35.9 0.079
Marlborough Sound1 29–100 140.9 61.3 0.096
1997
Golden Bay B 151 39.8 0.329
Golden Bay C 335 198.9 0.179
Tasman Bay E 15 2.1 0.015
Marlborough Sound 42–100 79 58.2 0.120
1 Marlborough Sound lies east of Tasman Bay.
2 CPUE is tonnes per day.
vector of vessel characteristics.17 The vessel characteristics that most significantly affect
variation of fishing power across vessels are the skipper’s experience, horsepower per
length of vessel, and the size of the dredge. The log of our Cobb-Douglas type produc-
tion function (in the form qi/Ei = aiXb) yields the following model for estimation:
log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) qE b X b S K b H PL ii i ii =+ + + 01 2 b b Dummy e ii
3() , + (16)
with the vessel characteristics being skipper’s experience (SKi) in years, horsepower
per length of vessel (HPi/Li), a dummy variable for the vessel’s dredge size and the
error term (ei). All variables are continuous except for the dredge size “dummy,”
that divides the size of dredges into two classes (table 3).18
In estimating equation (16), we replaced X with dummy variables for time and
area since all vessels face the same price and stock conditions in each area and time
period. The model also assumes the individual vessel’s characteristics are stable
across different levels of stock abundance. Ordinary least squares (OLS) was used to
estimate equation (16). The sign of the parameters indicates that skipper experience
and horsepower per length of boat increase the catch per vessel (table 4).19
17 The characteristics include the skipper’s experience, horsepower, vessel length, and size of dredge.
18 Of the 70 vessels analyzed within this fishery, 20 were missing one or more vessel characteristics. To
standardize effort for the 20 vessels (with an incomplete set of vessel characteristics), we need to esti-
mate their catch ratio. The calculated catch ratio of an individual vessel is its predicted yield divided by
the median vessel’s predicted yield. A value less than 1 implies the vessel has lower catching power than
the median vessel. Using the data on the 50 vessels (with complete set of vessel characteristics), we re-
gressed their individual catch ratio to their raw yield (raw catch). The parameter estimates were used to
estimate a predicted catch ratio on the 20 vessels (that had an incomplete set of vessel characteristics).
19 Condition indices indicated there was no multicollinearity. In addition, four models were examined
with different independent variable combinations. Changes in parameter estimates and t-statistics were
insignificant and parameter signs did not change, which also indicates no multicollinearity. This regres-
sion model assumes errors are identically and independently distributed. If the errors are not indepen-
dent or the variances are not constant, the parameter estimates remain unbiased, but the estimate of the
covariance matrix is inconsistent.Heteroskedasticity was rejected (df = 8, χ2 =1.57, Prob > χ2 = 0.99)






otal Catch (tonnes of meat), 
T
otal Ef
fort (days), and Catch-per
-Unit-of-Ef
fort (CPUE) by 
Y





































































































































































 CPUE is tonnes per day
.A New Zealand ITQ Fishery 241
Finally, to convert fishing effort to standardized fishing effort, a vessel’s fishing
effort was multiplied by the ratio of the vessel’s catching power to that of an arbi-
trary median vessel.
Estimation of Aggregate Production and Cost Functions
We estimated the following aggregate production function for the fleet of vessels:
Ya E X tt t t = α β, (17)
where at time t, Yt is aggregate catch per period, at is the fleet’s catchability coeffi-
cient, Et  is the amount of aggregate standardized effort per period (measured in days
absent from port), and Xt is the stock size (in tonnes of scallop meats).20 The esti-
mated form of the aggregate production function is:
log log log log . Ya E X tt t t =+ + αβ (18)
Several models were explored. We allowed the catchability coefficient to be
constant and variable. The specification that had the best fit allowed the fleet’s
catchability coefficient (at) to vary by week, where:
Table 4
Parameter Estimates of Cobb-Douglas Production Function
for Effort Standardization (standard errors in parentheses)
Variable Coefficients
Intercept (b0) –2.737* (0.17)
Log Skipper Experience (b1) 0.062*** (0.03)
Log Horsepower/Length (b2) 0.330* (0.12)
Dredge Class (b3) 0.207** (0.09)
* Statistically significant at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10%.
Table 3
Average Skipper Experience (years), Horsepower per Vessel Length,
and Number of Vessels by Dredge Class Size (standard errors in parentheses)
Dredge Size Classes Experience
(Meters) (Years) Horsepower/Length Number of Vessels
2.0 – 2.2 7.9 (7.3) 3.3 (0.7) 16
2.3 – 2.4 13.9 (10.1) 4.1 (1.8) 37
20 Note that our model is one of the generalized harvest functions in Morey (1986), where, in his nota-
tion, φ2 = φ3 = φ4 = φ5 = φ6 = 0, which corresponds to the Cobb-Douglas production function used here
(see Morey’s footnote 16).Bisack and Sutinen 242
ae t
intercept week = + ∗ () . δ
Since the marginal product of effort must not increase, α was restricted to be no
greater than 1.0. We allowed β to be free. Table 5 presents the parameter estimates
for the 1996 and 1997 productions functions. In this model β is greater than one for
both years. We did not correct for multicollinearity and autocorrelation when esti-
mating equation (18).21
Since cost data were not available,22 we approximated the unknown variable
cost function with the following 3rd order Taylor series expansion:




The method for estimating the parameters w1, w2, and w3 is described in the appendix.
Growth Estimation
We assume a linear growth rate function, where the weekly growth rate, r, is con-
stant for scallops in Golden Bay. That is,
Xt+1 = Xt (1 + r).
21 Multicollinearity exists in both models due to one independent estimate of abundance for each year.
The abundance estimate in the second week is equal to the abundance estimate in the first week minus
the harvest in the first week plus growth. This can be avoided in an annual model where independent
annual estimates are more likely to exist. However, for estimating a seasonal model, independent abun-
dance estimates for each week are not available. One method for reducing multicollinearity is to restrict
the variables, which has been done. Restrictions reduce the variance on parameter estimates at the cost
of introducing biases. The Durbin-Watson test indicated there was negative autocorrelation in 1996 and
no autocorrelation in 1997. Negative autocorrelation was anticipated as the stock size in one week is
related to the previous week and decreases when harvest exceeded growth. When the autocorrelation
was corrected for 1996, the signs of the parameter estimates changed. Although we observed negative
autocorrelation in 1996, the original model with autocorrelation was chosen over the corrected model,
which means the parameter estimates are unbiased but not minimum variance.
22 Midway through our study, researchers at Oregon State University attempted to survey vessel opera-
tors to collect costs and earnings data. However, the response rate was very poor and members of CSEC
reacted negatively to the attempt to collect the data. As a result, no useful data were collected in that
effort.
Table 5
Parameter Estimates of the 1996 and 1997
Production Function (standard errors in parentheses)
at
Year αβ Intercept δ
1996 11 1.3* (0.1) –8.2* (0.5) –0.08* (0.013)
1997 11 2.4* (1.1) –15.77* (6.4) –0.17** (0.03)
1 Restricted parameter estimate.
* Statistically significant at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10%.A New Zealand ITQ Fishery 243
Linear growth is a reasonable approximation since the harvest season of 12 weeks is
a short period. Meat weights at the beginning of each season were 31.6g and 27.0g
in 1996 and 1997, with weekly growth rates of 1.25g and 1.08g, respectively
(Cranfield, Micheal, and Doonan 1997).
Solution Methods
To assess the efficiency of the ITQ scallop fishery, we compared the numerical solu-
tion of the Nash-Cournot model, which simulates the ITQ-managed fishery, with the
numerical solution of the optimal model of the fishery. As explained in the appen-
dix, we used a GAMS numerical algorithm to solve for the harvest and effort path
that maximizes profits for each firm, given that every other firm is also maximizing
its profits. In addition, we used another GAMS algorithm to solve for the optimal,
fully efficient set of harvest and effort rates that maximizes fleet profits over all pe-
riods of the season. Both algorithms used the same production and cost functions.
The results of these computations are shown in table 6.
Results and Discussion
In comparing the numerical outcomes of the ITQ fishery and the optimal fishery, we
find that the ITQ harvest is greater than the optimal harvest in the first period of
both years (table 6, figure 2). As the weeks progress, the ITQ weekly harvest be-
comes less than the optimal weekly harvest. The optimal harvest path is flatter than
the harvest path under ITQ management. The ITQ system results in the application
of too much effort, resulting in higher than optimal landings of scallops early in the
fishing year; the classic “race-to-fish” scenario. The optimal harvest is spread more
evenly across weeks compared to the ITQ harvest path.23
23 The difference in total harvest between the observed ITQ and simulated ITQ fishery is 1.2% and 12%
in 1996 and 1997, respectively.
Table 6
The 1996 and 1997 ITQ and Optimal Harvest (tonnes) and Fishing Effort
(days fished) in Golden Bay by Week and Year
1996 1997
Harvest Effort Harvest Effort
Week ITQ Optimal ITQ Optimal ITQ Optimal ITQ Optimal
1 75.9 30.6 399 135 113.4 73.8 434 253
2 29.1 25.9 258 146 53.8 46.6 362 241
3 12.4 20.3 150 145 25.1 30.8 242 218
4 4.2 15.5 61 135 12.6 20.8 154 188
5 11.5 119 4.1 13.7 59 151
6 8.1 98 8.0 102
7 5.0 67 1.5 21
8 0.9 12
Total 121.6 117.6 868 857 209.0 195.2 1251 1174Bisack and Sutinen 244
An examination of the two sets of necessary conditions—equations (2)-(5) for
the optimal solution and equations (10)-(13) for the ITQ solution—helps to under-
stand the results of this study. There are several differences between the two sets of
conditions that are worth noting. First, the equilibrium price of quota, v*, is less than
or equal to the shadow price of the TAC for the optimal solution, λ*. This induces
individual firms under ITQs to harvest more than is optimal, ceteris paribus.24 As
explained above, optimal policy fully accounts for the stock effect; while under ITQ
policy, individual firms do not fully account for the stock effect. This can be seen by
comparing equation (6) for the optimal case with equation (15) for the ITQ case.
The term Σiπi
X appears in the numerator of the RHS of equation (6), while in equa-
tion (15) the comparable term is πi
X. The stock effect impacts the slope of the two
harvest paths differently, resulting in more scallops being harvested early in the fish-
Figure 2. Catch-per-Unit-of-Effort (CPUE) of Scallop Meats (tonnes) under
Optimal and Simulated ITQ Management by Week and Year
24 We expect v* ≤ λ* for the following reasons. Since the optimal solution maximizes aggregate profits
for the year, the multiplier, λ*, is the marginal value of another unit of TAC, given an optimal harvest
path by all firms. If the harvest path is non-optimal, total profits and the marginal value can only de-
cline. Hence, when the harvest path is non-optimal, the marginal value of the TAC is reduced. There-
fore, v* ≤ λi
t,  for a common TAC.A New Zealand ITQ Fishery 245
ing year under ITQs than is optimal. This difference is a principal cause of the race-
to-fish under this ITQ management scenario.
Profits are affected by the race-to-fish behavior under the ITQ management sce-
nario. In both years investigated, ITQ profits are estimated to be less than profits
from optimal harvest (table 7). Specifically, under ITQ management we estimate
that profits were 20.2% and 9.6% less in 1996 and 1997, respectively, than the maxi-
mum potential profits.25 According to this analysis, optimal management would have
provided each of the 70 firms with an additional $2,300 and $2,000 profit, on aver-
age, in 1996 and 1997, respectively, for two months of work in the fishery. Firms
could have worked less over a shorter period of time and earned more under an opti-
mal management arrangement than under the ITQ system currently employed in the
fishery.
Are these losses significant? There is no clear answer to this question. First, we
have not demonstrated whether the estimates of losses are statistically different from
fully efficient outcomes. Second, we have not accounted for the transactions costs of
negotiating and implementing arrangements to fully internalize the stock externality.
Another of the limitations of this study is the lack of cost data for vessel scallop
trips. As a result, the model is simplified to include a simple cubic cost function.
While these simplifications may affect the magnitude of the estimated efficiency
losses, the qualitative nature of the results would not be affected if cost data were
available.26 It is not known whether our cost estimate is biased up or down.
Concluding Remarks
The analysis in this paper indicates that ITQ management in the New Zealand
Southern scallop fishery may not be fully efficient (as predicted by Boyce 1992 for
fisheries with an in-season stock externality). It appears that the CSEC had not, as
of 1996–97, fully internalized the stock externality in the fishery, with consequent
estimated losses ranging from 9.6% to 20.2%, or from $2,000 to $2,300 foregone
profits per firm.
In addition to the in-season stock externality, constant ex-vessel prices, which
actually prevailed in the Southern scallop fishery, reinforce the race-to-fish. If price
varied with landings, the harvest path under ITQ management would be flatter, since
25 Profits are less because, inter alia, CPUE is lower under ITQ management (figure 2).
26 A sensitivity analysis on the cost parameters was conducted. Parameters were increased and decreased
by 10% and 20% for both the N-C and optimal model. The percentage differences in profits between the
N-C and optimal changed by less than 1% for the range of –20% to +20% in the cost parameters.
Table 7
Total 1996 and 1997 Industry Profits, Effort, and Harvest: Optimal vs. ITQ Management
Profit ($1,000s) Total Effort (Days) Total Harvest (Tonnes)
Year Optimal ITQ % Difference Optimal ITQ Optimal ITQ
1996 797.8 636.6 20.2 857 868 117.8 121.6
1997 1,491.2 1,348.7 9.6 1,174 1,251 195.2 209.0Bisack and Sutinen 246
fishers would be partially compensated for their extra costs of fishing when the
CPUE is low. For reasons that are not clear to us, processors have maintained con-
stant ex-vessel prices throughout the year. While a varying processor price would
change the slope of the harvest path, the outcome under ITQ management would re-
main sub-optimal, however.
The problem in the scallop fishery is similar to the problem commonly experi-
enced in oil fields. When rival firms hold production rights to a common-pool
resource, there is a race to produce. This results in overproduction and excessive
capitalization that has characterized the US petroleum industry. The principal public
policy tool to resolve this problem has been unitization of oil fields (Libecap and
Smith 2001). Under unitization, a group of firms share in the risks, costs, and ben-
efits associated with exploration, development, and production of oil. As a result,
the rival firms are ‘linked by a common incentive to maximize the overall economic
value of the field’ (Libecap and Smith 2001). Efficient production under unitization oc-
curs when the common-pool resource consists of a single substance with a uniform
value. Ideally, unitization would create a ‘virtual firm’ that would produce scallops
at maximum efficiency. The firm would, in effect, function as the sole owner of the
resource. Owners of the virtual firm would share the costs and benefits of produc-
tion, and they would realize maximum profits from the common-pool resource.
We can view the establishment of the CSEC as a voluntary effort to unitize pro-
duction in the fishery. The formation of the CSEC has allowed scallop quota owners
to share in the risks, cost, and benefits of scallop production. It appears, however,
that their efforts towards unitization have not fully succeeded in maximizing net
benefits from the resource. This finding is consistent with Libecap and Smith (2001)
who conclude that firms may adopt organizational arrangements that are imperfect
solutions to the common-pool problem. One reason for such ‘imperfect’ solutions
may be the high transactions costs of agreeing to and implementing a policy to fully
internalize the stock externality.
Boyce (1992, p.403) argues correctly that property rights should be assigned in
ways that take into account the nature of the externalities operating in that fishery.
He suggests assigning shares in the profits from the fishery, which, he argues, would
force fishermen to internalize the externalities. This could be achieved in the South-
ern scallop fishery with a complete leaseback of quota to the CSEC such that a
centralized decision maker or manager controls the entire TAC. The manager would
compute the optimal amounts to harvest each period (e.g., weekly) and hire fishing
units to produce the desired amounts. The net returns (profits) from the centralized
operation would then be shared among the quota holders according to the quantity
of quota each owns.
There are at least two other ways in which the CSEC may be able to stem the
race-to-fish behavior and improve returns from the fishery. The key features of a
second method are quota dated by period (e.g., weekly) and a market for trades
across periods. This method would allow decentralized production decisions. Under
this method, the CSEC would distribute the TAC across periods for each quota
holder, or initially assign a single date to all of the TAC. If a fluid market exists for
trades of dated quota, the quota would be priced and distributed optimally across all
periods of the fishing year. Dated quota prices would be higher in the earlier periods
when marginal returns are higher, and prices would be lower during the latter peri-
ods, reflecting the stock depletion that has occurred.
Finally, a third method would involve assigning territorial rights to firms. Each
firm could exclusively harvest an assigned territory at their individual fishing pace.
Other firms would not be allowed to fish in another firm’s area. The practice would
be similar to farming individual plots. The spatial harvesting rights could be made
tradable such that the rights are allocated efficiently and the maximum net benefitsA New Zealand ITQ Fishery 247
are realized from the fishery. The spatial rights can be initially auctioned, assigned
by lottery, or negotiated. This method may be infeasible or undesirable, however, if
the transactions costs of negotiation, monitoring, and enforcing a program of spatial
harvesting rights are too great.27
In our judgment, there are significant benefits to future research on the manage-
ment of this and similar fisheries that are subject to stock depletion. One avenue of
such research could expand the current model to examine harvesting over several
years, in an inter- and intra-year bioeconomic model. A forestry-type model (along
the lines of Hartman (1976)) could be applied to focus on when to harvest the scal-
lops within a year and to determine the optimal annual rotation of seeding and
harvesting different areas.
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Appendix
Estimation of Cost Parameters
We estimated the set of cost parameters w = [w1, w2, w3] as follows: We first selected
an arbitrary set of values for the cost parameters, w, and solved the Nash-Cournot
model twice, once for 1996 and once for 1997. Our General Algebraic Modeling
System (GAMS) numerical algorithm solved for the harvest path, qi
t
*, that maxi-
mizes profits for the i-th firm. The specific problem is to:
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For firm i, qi
t
* is endogenous, and for the other N-1 firms, qj
t is exogenous. We chose
a starting value for qj
t and then updated it using the following equation:







j ( ) ( ) [ ( )],  , , , * += + − =… 11 Δ   
where r is the run or iteration number (R=50) and Δ = 0.10. This resulted in a solu-
tion to the Nash-Cournot model such that all firms’ harvest rates were within 1% of
each other in each period; i.e., such that:





i −≤ 0 001
The resulting simulated Nash-Cournot harvest paths were compared to the actual ob-
served harvest paths for 1996 and 1997. We calculated the sum of squared
differences for each combination of the following parameter values.
Cost Parameter Range of Values Intervals
w1 300 to 1,500 25
w2 2 to 20 1
w3 2 to 20 1A New Zealand ITQ Fishery 249
From our global grid search, the following set of values for w had the minimum sum
of squared differences for each week and for both years:




The year 1997 accounted for the largest proportion of the squared differences (86%).
In other words, the model fit the actual observed harvest rates best for 1996 and not
as well for 1997. These cost parameter values were used for calculating both the
Nash-Cournot and the optimal solutions reported in the main text.